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Wise men once said there could be light So why should there be darkness 
now 7
— Alexander Dubcek to a mass rally in 
Wenceslas Square, Prague, Czechoslovakia, 
November 1989
Europe as a Rubik's Cube
Sir Edward Grey would be pleased to see the lamps of Europe again 
being lit1 The revolutionary changes sweeping the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe spring hope that, seventy-five years after World War I, freer political 
systems may again flourish from the Atlantic to the Urals, that all of Europe s 
peoples may share m its prosperity, that all may feel secure within settled 
national frontiers, and that Europe may again be united as ideological 
differences dissolve and as underlying common values surface and converge 
to forge new European bonds across national boundaries Whether these 
aims, shared by an increasing number of Europeans from Moscow to Madrid, 
will be achieved depends critically on our understanding of Europe s crises 
and their global implications We need new conceptual tools as a 
precondition for refashioning the collective will and resources of Europe s 
peoples and those of the United States to turn turmoil to good purpose
The conceptual and psychological barriers to understanding are 
formidable The Cold War had so conditioned our thinking and responses 
that, until the abrupt collapse of the Berlin Wall in November11989, it 
appeared wildly visionary to think, much less to suggest, that the European 
Cold War regime might be dismantled 2 The Brezhnev-Nixon-Carter-Reagan 
years froze the European Cold War regime that essentially crystallized m the 
allied defeat of Nazi Germany and m the subsequent superpower struggle for 
global ascendancy 3 The regime s components included a European order that 
divided the continent and Germany ideologically, and consolidated the split 
into two military blocs that established governments based on opposing 
principles of legitimacy—the Western half on open, pluralistic systems, the 
Eastern half on one-party, Communist rule, and that applied contrasting 
solutions to the imperatives of socioeconomic welfare—one affirming the 
private ownership of the means of production and market practices, the other 
trumpeting socialist norms and command economies These provisional 
solutions to European order, legitimacy, and welfare were the microcosm of a 
regime that the two superpowers strove to impose, m fits and starts and with 
varying degrees of failure, on other peoples and states in their global struggle, 
as superpower bipolarity temporarily supplanted the Euro-centric system in 
the immediate years after World War II
Vietnam and Afghanistan and the relative (but differential) economic 
decime of both superpowers reveal an inability to shape the world beyond
2Europe in preferred ways 4 Now the superpowers provisional solutions to 
Europe s postwar problems no longer hold, repudiated by some of their once 
most ardent partisans What is disturbing, however, is that there are no clear 
and universally accepted remedies for the current crises in Europe to replace 
the Cold War regime and the perversely reassuring expectations that it 
generated once installed As a first step toward re-assessment, we should 
disabuse ourselves of old ways of thinking and doing business and shake the 
the comfortable, but misguided, belief that they will be relevant and 
responsive to the powerful forces that have produced the present crises 
These forces are themselves partly m reaction to the sclerosis engendered by 
the Cold War stalemate An incrementalist mentality risks misconstruing 
the depth and the global proportions of the challenges we now face and 
minimizing the efforts that will have to be made by Europeans and 
Americans to ensure that Western preferences prevail—to keep the lamps lit 
and to multiply their number
As Dean Acheson might have said, we are again present at the 
creation 5 Who can gainsay that the fall of the Berlin Wall is equal in 
significance, real and symbolic, to the storming of a British ship in Boston 
harbor, of the Bastille m Paris, or of the Winter Palace in Leningrad7 The 
discussion below sketches the complexities and inner contradictions of the 
crises of order, legitimacy, and welfare which today put Europeans and 
Americans at risk, but before rare and inviting opportunities Each of these 
three domains of crisis is itself trifurcated into at least three additional 
components—a kind of Rubik s Cube whose parts, now disassembled, pose a 
puzzle about how they are once again to be put back together
A closing section identifies some of the principles that should guide us 
through this transition to a post-Cold War Europe, in re-assembling, if you 
will, the European Rubik s Cube We need to return to the breadth of 
strategic thinking that animated the early postwar period that led to the 
Marshall Plan and to the formation of the Atlantic Alliance Two world wars 
and successive economic depressions argued against over a hundred and fifty 
years of deliberate isolation from Europe s problems as if they were not our 
own or of interest to us 6 A narrow focus on military strategy and crisis 
^management, until now the concentrated concern and product of a Cold War 
mentality, must be discarded if the current crises are to be surmounted We 
have to relearn how to fashion grand strategies (though not necessarily Grand 
Designs) that meet these crises on their own terms These are defined not 
only by their multiple dimensions but also by their simultaneity, synergism, 
and systemic impact Since we do not have a world war to jolt us from our 
Cold War thinking and tinkering, we will have to simulate the perturbation 
associated with these convulsions to see, conceptually and psychologically, 
the old world m a new light
3Crisis of Order 
A Receding Soviet Threat
This crisis initially assumes three dimensions The first, and most 
important dimension, is the increasing unreliability of the Soviet Union and 
the Warsaw Pact as adversaries on which to base NATO military planning 
and the political cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance The evidence of a 
declining Soviet threat is persuasive and accumulating Politically, a vast 
campaign has been launched to expose the atrocities and oppression of 
Stalinist totalitarianism and the corruption and economic failings of 
Brezhnev authoritarianism Glasnost and perestroika have ushered in 
limited elections to a newly created parliament as well as efforts to protect the 
rights of Soviets to enjoy a greater measure of personal freedom of 
expression, religion, and movement, against an all-powerful state and party 
The mellowing of the Soviet state and party, as Kennan envisioned,7 now 
propels the arms control process with the West forward, promotes detente in 
Europe and around the globe to unprecedented postwar levels, and prompts 
the passing of Commumst, one-party rule throughout a gradually dissolving 
Eastern bloc
New strategic thinking pervades Soviet military doctrine to keep m 
step with Party Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev s new political thinking aimed 
at de-nuclearizing and de-militarizmg international relations 8 What first 
appeared as a piece of propaganda, the January 1986 party statement on 
disarmament, now appears to be a planmng document Notions, like 
defensive-defense, war prevention (not fighting), and asymmetrical cuts to 
assure opponents, have now become common currency in the Soviet military 
literature Soviet arms control goals now include the elimination of the 
possibility to launch a surprise attack and decreasing capabilities to carry out 
large-scale offensive operations, [and] establishment of an unquestionable 
superiority [on] the side [of] defensive potentials over offensive 
potentials 9
Deeds match words In December 1986, Moscow agreed to an elaborate 
process of monitoring troop movements and exerases in Europe, including 
provision for intrusive intervention to inspect Soviet forces and faalities 
Under the Stockholm accord, engineered within the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation m Europe (CSCE), military activities involving more than 
75,000 troops require two years notice, those over 40,000, one year10 In 
December 1987, the United States and the Soviet Umon signed a treaty to 
eliminate all nuclear weapons in ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers 
The Soviet Umon then proposed negotiations on eliminating all nuclear 
missile systems from Europe and, presumably, from Asia in harmony with 
the INF formula Double-zero would become triple-zero On December 1988,
4Gorbachev announced a unilateral cut of 500,000 Soviet troops, along with 
several nuclear weapons batteries, and the destruction of 5,000 tanks
Meanwhile, concessions have been made at START to U S urgings, 
including counting bombers as only one warhead (That means actual 
warhead levels of perhaps up to 9,000 will be counted as 6,000 warheads )
Both sides also agreed to disagree on the broad U S interpretation of what 
research, development, and testing is permitted under the ABM treaty11 At 
Vienna, the Soviets presented a plan that closely approximated the Western 
position, a convergence that has since narrowed when President Bush 
included aircraft in the scope of the negotiations Limited, but discernible, 
progress has also been made on controlling the production and transfer of 
chemical weapons and on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty where the 
United States, not the Soviet Union, has been dragging its feet12 Moreover, 
in announcing cuts in military spending (confirmed by U S intelligence), 
Soviet Prime Mimster Nikolai Ryzhkov admitted for the first time that the 
Soviet Union spends more than four times as much on the military than had 
previously been acknowledged13 Several months later, Foreign Minister 
Edward Shevardnadze also conceded that the Soviet Union had violated the 
ABM treaty in building a phased-array radar station at Krasnoyarsk and 
pledged that the facility would be dismantled14
These military cutbacks and arms and disarmament initiatives have 
been supplemented by a gradual Soviet withdrawal from regional conflicts 
around the globe and the pointed repudiation of the Brezhnev doctrine that 
attempted to legitimate Soviet intervention abroad Soviet troops have been 
withdrawn from Afghanistan and the intervention was declared to have been 
a contravention of international law (although Soviet military aid still 
sustains the Najibullah regime) Moscow also reduced its military assistance 
to the Luanda government and facilitated Cuban military withdrawal both 
from Angola and Ethiopia CIA reports also confirmed that military supplies 
to Nicaragua have slowed This pattern of disengagement and reductions m 
overseas commitments reached doctrinal status m Gorbachev s Helsinki 
pronouncement of fall 1989, preceding only by weeks, the demise of the old 
guard Communist regimes in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, 
that the socioeconomic and political institutions of other states were matters 
to be decided by the domestic populations of those states, and not by outside 
intervention
Excessive Defense Spending
But even if the Soviet threat were not dramatically diminishing, there 
would still be heavy pressures within the Western alliance to cut forces This 
forms a second crisis affecting European security and order Secretary of 
Defense Richard Cheney has already announced the prospect of $180 billion 
in defense spending over the next five years These cuts will inevitably affect
5NATO since European defense is the single largest spending program within 
the Pentagon budget House Armed Services chairman, Les Aspin, has put 
the Pentagon on notice that F Y 1991 will be a Gramm-Rudman-Gorbachev 
budget Since 1985, Congress has annually cut defense requests to bring 
spending closer into line with national means At the start of the Bush 
administration, it was conservatively estimated that a $300 billion defense 
budget was chasing and rapidly losing ground to $400 billion planning goals 
Service on the national debt has doubled since 1980 from approximately 8 to 
15 percent Interest rates remain high relative to European and Japanese 
competitors, braking U S economic investment and inhibiting 
competitiveness abroad 15
As the popularity of Paul Kennedy s bleak assessment of the negative 
impact of military spendmg on economic growth suggests,16 there is a 
widening consensus in the United States that the principal long-term threat 
to the United States is economic, not strategic Competition from Asia and 
Europe—specifically Japan and the European Community—threaten to erode 
further declining U S economic and technological competitiveness, the 
source of its political influence and military prowess That the assistance 
package offered by South Korea to Poland was equal to that of the proposal of 
the Bush administration (until doubled by Congress) to assist the new non- 
Commumst government, reveals how narrowly conceived are current 
American policies They confuse muddling through, marginal adjustments, 
temporizing pronouncements, and reflexive pragmatism with an integrated 
strategy, directed by clear, long-term, national aims
Other Western governments are under the same economic and welfare 
pressures as Washington to cut their budgets If Thatcher s Britain is the 
most vociferous advocate of holding the line in NATO, the British 
government has been among the first to cut defense spending, particularly for 
conventional arms, which are more needed in this transition period beyond 
the Cold War than Trident missiles for NATO defenses A declining birthrate 
and a reduction in the length of compulsory military service will lead to a cut 
in Germany s armed forces, the bulwark of NATO s conventional posture, 
from 600,000 to 420,000 The cumulative total of unilateral cuts in NATO 
numbers and readmess, driven by budgetary imperatives, may well be greater 
than the reductions proposed by the West at Vienna
While a declining Soviet threat could not have been more fortuitous, 
it does not follow that arms control by happenstance will naturally result in a 
safer and stabler Europe The arms control, budgetary, and strategic processes 
within allied governments and NATO are simply in disarray, each pushed by 
its own logic and parochial interests The dispute between West Germany 
and its allies over short-range nuclear weapons, up to the eleventh hour 
pnor to the opening of the April 1989 NATO meeting, illustrates how even 
evident need has not been enough to bnng them permanently into
6alignment NATO s strategy of flexible response, already in question, can no 
longer be considered a sound basis for planning since it cannot be sustained 
under present circumstances But what new defense concepts are at the ready 
to replace it7
We should expect, as seasoned observers anticipate, that reductions m 
armed forces will be driven by service and bureaucratic imperatives for 
organizational survival In the present climate, we are not likely to see a 
radical revision of strategic doctrine based on a clear reassessment of threats to 
national security with matching new military requirements to meet them 
Nor can Congress be fully counted upon to demonstrate the discipline needed 
to buy the defense that is needed and to resist eliminating redundant bases or 
purchasing outmoded weapons when these cuts might damage constituent 
interests Quite aside from these barriers to reform of defense planning and 
to calculated cuts in military spending, guided by a réévaluation of changing 
but recedmg external threats, there are also pent-up welfare demands that 
may at any moment erupt into a budgetary earthquake as the charged tectonic 
plates of competing military and civilian demands no longer prove 
containable, a nsk that will be particularly acute if the economy slips into a 
recession
Rising Nationalism
As the alliances break up, yet a third crisis of order emerges The Cold 
War obscured the critical role that both superpowers played m fostering 
postwar reconciliation in Europe and m regulating European nationalism 
The German problem was provisionally resolved by division Within each 
bloc, Moscow and Washington encouraged (or imposed) rules for national 
harmonization Unreserved American support for European union— 
through the Marshall Plan and subsequently through defense and economic 
cooperation—contributed to West Germany s rehabilitation and reintegration 
into Western Europe For Cold War reasons, Moscow played a similar role 
with respect to East Germany Both alliances and their superpower 
hegemony arbitrated age-old national rivalries, Moscow between its East 
European clients, the Umted States between France and Germany, as well as 
Greece and Turkey Now the prospect of a umted Germany and heightened 
Eastern European national conflict, Baltic state secessiomsm, and ethnic civil 
war in Azerbaizan, raise prominently into view problems that were only 
shelved, not solved Within the span of a single, brief lifetime, Europe and 
the world were plunged into two global wars as a consequence of Europe s 
unremitting national rivalries There is little historical precedent for the 
belief that national self-determination, however much an antidote to the 
excesses of the Cold War, will necessarily lead to a more peaceful Europe if it 
is again released, uninhibited by countervailing international restraints or 
alliance commitments and obligations
7The superpower dilemma is yet more complex On one hand, there is 
much to be said for weakening the link between the superpower rivalry in 
Europe, with its potential for ruinous nuclear war, and age-old national and 
communal enmities A dissolution of the two alliances dictates a dilution of 
nuclear-suffused commitments On the other hand, except for the 
Conference on Security and Coopération in Europe and a weak Western 
European Umon, there are no ready European institutions to replace the 
superpowers and the two alliances in the performance of their regulating and 
arbitrating functions m mediating between European national rivalries and, 
specifically, between Germany and its neighbors The danger arises that civil 
strife or national conflict in Eastern Europe (both ills already widely abroad 
within the Soviet Union) may elicit Moscow s military (or the West s 
economic and political) intervention with the inadvertent but untoward 
effect of arresting the European détente process and the reform movement 
within the Soviet Umon In kicking over the traces of their respective 
spheres of influence, which furnished a provisional peace for Europe, the 
superpowers cannot escape the consequent challenge still to be addressed—of 
defining new démarcation lines to specify the limits of permissible 
intervention in the affairs of European states
Crisis of Legitimacy
The three crises of order now convulsing Europe are symptomatic of 
even more profound distress These concern the legitimacy of the Soviet 
regime, the bankruptcy of one-party Commumst systems in Eastern Europe, 
and the division of Germany
The Legitimacy of a Leninist Party and Stalinist State
The paradox of the Soviet reform movement, advanced by glasnost 
and perestroika, is the reliance of Party Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and his 
collaborators on the power and authority of the Communist party and state to 
effect the socioeconomic and political transformation of the Soviet Union 
The security of the West and the prospects of détente hinge critically, 
therefore, on Gorbachev s use of authoritarian institutions, the very 
legitimacy of which must be raised into question as a consequence of the 
reforms they are charged to implement Unlike Eastern Europe, Soviet 
reform was initiated and conducted primarily from the top down, without 
initial broad-based insistence or popular support mobilized against an 
entrenched party and governmental bureaucracy, habituated to 
unquestioning rule and skeptical of changes that would weaken their power 
and status
However much Gorbachev may appear to be in formal control of the 
state and party apparatus and the military, obstacles to reform should not be 
underestimated nor should excessive trust be placed in the reliability of the
8delicate and internally contradictory alliances on which his power and the 
reform movement appear to depend Party and governmental bureaucracies 
must still be convinced, cajoled, and even coerced to implement a reform 
program that will decrease their influence, not to mention personal status 
and privileges Moreover, judged by short-term economic measures, the 
Gorbachev reforms, now in train for a period longer than an American 
presidential term in office, have not been able to break the bureaucratic 
gridlock of central planning Worse, as the worker strikes in Siberia revealed, 
the regime has even failed to provide for basic needs, like food and soap, or to 
convince Soviet workers that working harder and more efficiently, under 
conditions of lowered certainty about job retention (or about access to enough 
vodka to dull daily cares) is necessarily a sure prescription for a better life
Ironically, the reformist forces unleashed by glasnost and perestroika 
contribute to their erosion Ethnic conflict m Azerbaijan and Georgia has 
been unwittingly incited, religious fervor and fundamentalism, Christian and 
Moslem, have been aroused, and national sentiment and calls for 
independence, centered m the Baltic republics, have been stirred, extending to 
demands for political pluralism, greater freedom of expression, and the end of 
one-party rule However, the reforms, unleashed by glasnost and perestroika, 
have yet to be fully applied to the Soviet Union itself since the Communist 
party continues to monopolize power Meanwhile, the Gorbachev regime is 
caught between its own supporters of renewal who want even more sweeping 
changes to be applied at a faster pace, and still powerful conservative forces 
throughout the party and government who remain unreconciled to reforms 
at home and to the concessions made abroad on matters of socialist principle 
and national interest The latter is exemplified by the INF treaty in which 
Moscow will destroy many more missiles than the United States In contrast 
to Eastern Europe, there persists in the Soviet Union a conjectural, if 
objectively contradictory, convergence of bureaucratic and mass interest in 
stemming or slowing internal reform
Identifying the diffuse elements of Gorbachev s coalition reveals the 
delicacy of his position First, in a formal sense, much of his power rests on 
his position as party chief and as the elected president of the newly 
constructed national legislative assembly To this base must be added those 
from scattered sources who support his efforts those in the liberal 
professions, intellectuals, and reformist-minded clusters of party and 
governmental officials Externally, he also depends on the mass support of 
Eastern European populations for the internal reform of their regimes and 
the elimination of one-party Communist rule which, paradoxically, is 
precisely his principal instrument to effect reform in the Soviet Umon This 
circularity and the dilemmas that it implies have not gone unnoticed either 
to the partisans or the opponents of reform The struggle between Gorbachev 
and the now discredited regime of Erich Honecker m East Germany is a case 
study of how the politics of reform were being played out in Eastern Europe
9for the highest stakes—survival But a reversal of fortunes cannot be 
excluded
Gorbachev is also banking on increased support from Western states 
and corporations for greater trade, investment, credits, and technological 
know-how to ensure the success of his reforms And, m light of his visit to 
the Vatican in November 1989, organized religion has also been enlisted into 
service to save and extend Soviet reforms Could one imagine more 
unkindly cuts delivered to Marxist-Leninist dogma in the Soviet Union than 
for the Communist regime m power to rely on the opiate of the people and 
capitalists to ensure the success of socialism7 Can one confidently predict, 
however, that a loose and uncoordinated group of reformers in the Soviet 
Union and in Eastern Europe, of Western governments and bureaucracies, 
capitalist banks and corporations, and institutional religions is, necessarily, a 
winning coalition7
The Demise of Coerced Social Compacts
Furthermore, we cannot be certain that the political and economic 
revolutions spreading like a prairie fire through Eastern Europe will achieve 
the heady expectations putatively attributed to them None has had a history 
of commitment to democratic government or much experience in making its 
slow and cumbersome processes work Czechoslovakia, an untidy creation of 
World War I and still divided against itself along ethnic and communal lines, 
had only a brief encounter with democracy before succumbing, first to Nazi 
and then to Communi^ rule Poland, having emerged after over a century of 
domination by three empires, did not long sustain democratic institutions 
after World War I and slid gradually into army rule The experience of the 
other Eastern European states has hardly been more encouraging All of these 
states are m a free fall where the coerced social compacts of the postwar era no 
longer apply, but where new, representative, and popular instruments of rule 
have yet to be fashioned and tried
These emerging democratic regimes, forced to the surface by crisis and 
necessity, will inevitably be held responsible for surmounting the economic 
and political crises that vaulted them to power Their failure can only 
damage the good will and confidence that their populations will have 
entrusted to them The legitimacy of open institutions does not solely 
depend on their intrinsic worth in allowing greater pluralism and free 
expression As Sir Henry Maine, no friend of popular government, observed 
more than a century ago, it would be a mistake to assume that the functions 
of democracy and those of a monarchy were essentially different17
Like their authoritarian predecessors, the fragile and still ill-formed 
democracies of Eastern Europe must still deliver on security and welfare, 
while burdened, perhaps beyond the breaking pomt, by a history of 
accumulating economic disasters, gross inefficiency and mismanagement,
10
and flagrant corruption There is now much talk throughout the Soviet 
Union and its Eastern empire that a whole generation was lost to flawed 
social experimentation Is it reasonable to expect that, simultaneously, the 
sins of the past can be quickly overcome and that present urgencies can be 
addressed7 But if the fledgling democracies of Eastern Europe fail, can 
corrosive cynicism and the demoralization of these populations be stayed7 
While historical analogies always limit themselves, the experience of the 
Weimar Republic is not encouraging in these respects Widespread unrest 
and social dislocation, first with the impoverishment of the middle class m 
the 1920s and then the misery of the working classes in the Great Depression 
of the 1930s, provoked the search for radical solution to escape from the 
impasse and prepared the way for the rise to power of the Nazi regime
The Division of Germany
The Soviet and Eastern European crises of legitimacy have led 
inexorably to a third, the bonded parts of which, while conceptually 
distinguishable, are politically and morally indissociable the bankruptcy of 
the East German regime and the division of Germany As offspring of the 
Cold War, both violate universally recognized principles of legitimacy 
national self-determination and popular sovereignty, both stand against 
nationalism, the most powerful and durable emotional force of the past 
several centuries Toleration of these exceptions (or ignoring them) could be 
justified since, under Cold War conditions, there was little that could be 
practically done about them except to ameliorate their harshest features 
(hence Bonn s passionate commitment to détente since the formation of the 
Grand Coalition in the 1960s) Moreover, the frustration of principle and 
emotion were partly the price and the provisional solution to a German 
national expansionism that, arguably, had plunged Europe into war three 
times in less than a century18
The barriers to posing the issue of German unification now appear to 
have breached along with the Berlin wall The initiative of German 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl, without prior consultation with foreign capitals, m 
proposing a ten-point plan for the gradual German confederation and 
eventual unification, evidences the rapid Germamzation of the unification 
issue beyond the control, if still not the weighty influence, of the Big Four 
powers 19 Both the Christian Democratic and Social Democratic parties are on 
record as favoring discussion of the problem which, as late as early November 
1989 would have been considered premature at best
The political vacuum in East Germany and the call of reformers and 
New Forum leaders for free elections and a vote on unification swells 
internal support for addressing unification and linking it with East German 
democratization Unlike the other states of Eastern Europe, East Germany is a 
progeny of the Cold War Its existence and tenuous legitimacy hinges
decisively on that power arrangement and regime As the Cold War 
unravels, it is no accident that the East German regime followed suit at an 
even faster rate of dismemberment That it may be able to retain a separate 
state existence, if the issue were put to a free vote of the German people, 
would appear to be problematic The continued existence of two German 
states would signify a reversal of historic trends That would imply, as de 
Gaulle would have been the first to deny, that the German people, who had 
been activated to support gigantic national efforts for the sake of national 
union and then to sustain two world wars m this century at incalculable cost, 
would abandon their past It would also mean an exception to the rule 
applied by all other peoples who have affirmed the nation-state and their 
own national identity, quite apart from differing ideological or political 
persuasion or regional differentiation, as the principal sources of legitimate 
authority 20
Aside from these powerful atavistic urgencies for national union,21 
there are also persuasive practical considerations pressing for unification now 
that the Cold War wall has been breached Why should East Germany be a 
burdensome ward of West Germany, as reformers m East Germany recognize, 
when its population can speed their economic development by being 
integrated within a larger German polity and European Community, freeing 
their own underutilized human and material resources in the bargain7 If the 
ruling Christian Democratic Party is prepared to confront the issue, despite 
the obvious costs to the West German economy m the shortrun, the Social 
Democratic Party also has incentive to continue its embrace of unification, a 
mark of the party since its formation As former German Chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer feared, the SPD might well be the principal beneficiary at the polls 
of an expanded electorate, although this outcome is by no means a certainty 
Economic and political interests conspire with moral imperatives and deep- 
seated nationalism to erode the supports for anomalous German 
exceptionalism
No one can predict how the issue of German unification will be 
resolved The Cold War solution is no longer viable unless it is reinstituted 
by Soviet arms The neighbors of the two Germâmes and the Big Four will 
undoubtedly exert pressures, already at work m their initial reaction to the 
German crisis, to retain as much of their receding wartime rights and their 
droit de regard over German security policy The Germamzation of the 
German issue limits the influence of these external forces when they come 
into clash with those arising from within the two Germâmes and from deep 
within the German volk Le Monde s editor, André Fontaine, has captured 
this new political condition within Europe as well as anyone It is the 
assumption and point of departure on which further speculation about 
Germany must henceforward proceed Whatever one may hope or fear, 
whatever one may think of polls, more or less contradictory, conducted on 
the subject of the two Germâmes, it leaps out at you that [the German people]
12
are engaged down the path of their unification, if not as a state, then as a 
nation The men, women, and children who mixed together for three days 
from one end of the wall to the other, suddenly breachable, belonged to the 
same people, spoke the same language, repaired to the same moral and 
cultural references, [and] constituted one single family 22
If the division of Europe and Germany were illegitimate, then the Cold 
War regime that produced it is also illegitimate and has to be undone 23 But 
if German unification can be achieved—a concession that, as Walter 
Lippmann recognized over forty years ago, only the Soviet Union had the 
power ultimately to grant24 —what purpose then do the two alliances serve7 
Much of the raison d etre of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, to protect each 
bloc s German segment, would no longer exist if Germany were peacefully 
unified The two Germâmes could no longer function as key elements of 
rival military organizations, nor could German soil be prepared as the future 
battleground between the two blocs The problem for the West will be 
particularly acute Most of NATO s conventional forces are now supplied by 
West Germany, and they would have no purpose to serve aside from policing 
their own territory The problem of checking possible future German 
expansionism would remain (to the degree that it is still a problem), but, 
however resolved, this residual of World War II cannot be addressed within 
the framework of the existing bloc system since it rests squarely on Germany s 
continued division
Crisis m Welfare -
From Command to Market Economies
The crises in order and legitimacy are entangled—and reinforced—by 
the crisis of welfare that, while most dramatically played out m the Eastern 
European upnsmgs, is in actuality of global proportions Its European 
dimension has at least three components of differing insistence and priority 
The first is the obvious failure of the socialist economic systems of Eastern 
Europe to provide for basic consumer needs, to sustain innovation and 
technological development, and to compete m a world market The GNP of 
the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states is one-third that of the 
Western alliance states and Japan The gap is widening, not closing Japan, 
with half the population, may well surpass the Soviet Union in output before 
long As Paul Dibb persuasively argues, the Soviet Union is a one-sided 
superpower—Upper Volta with nuclear weapons, as German Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt disparagingly observed 25
Transforming command economies will be neither easy nor cheap 
There is, first of all, the thorny issue of public ownership and privatization 
Aside from the problems of how a socialist state sells, leases, and divests itself 
of the national ownership of the means of the production, it is not clear how
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these bankrupt enterprises can be made attractive to foreign investors or 
foreign governments with credits to spare, even if these proprietary issues 
could be solved The absence of managerial talent accustomed to market 
competition and the labor resistance to expose itself to unemployment and 
fluctuating wage rates are also formidable barriers to reform Habits die hard 
Western models of family ownership and entrepreneurship in agriculture are 
not readily adaptable to collectivization Shock treatments that would permit 
the price of food to rise steeply to reflect true production costs might well 
prompt riots similar to those m other countries where such unpalatable 
remedies were applied (Egypt and Poland) In any event, this option is hardly 
calculated to win the support of workers and peasants for reforms Finally, 
those who enjoy privilege and status under the existing system do not appear 
ready, without a flght, to relinquish their hold on the economy 26
An Open or Closed Europe
The second crisis of welfare is less obvious but in the long run it is 
more critical for Europe s (and the globe s) future If a capitalist-based, market 
system has performed better than command economies (arguably, a matter of 
faint praise rather than a fully satisfying accomplishment), the chronic 
problems of unemployment, poverty, and the uneven and unequal 
distribution of wealth continue to plague the developed states Exposing the 
dismal failure of Stalinist socialism, however, does little to quiet the demands 
for greater social welfare endemic to contemporary mass society 27 The 
renewed determination of the European states to achieve an integrated 
market by 1992 responds to imperatives that cannot be met solely within a 
national framework It is no accident that France has been in the forefront of 
this movement and that Community President Jacques Delors, a former 
French economics minister under the first Socialist government of the Fifth 
Republic, is the Commumty s most prominent spokesman for market 
integration The conspicuous failure of the French Socialist government s 
failure in the early 1980s to solve France s unemployment and 
underinvestment problems through national pump-primmg techniques— 
classical Keynesianism—testifies to the impotence of purely national 
initiatives that defy market forces and that run counter to the fiscal policies of 
other, more powerful states 28
Integrating the Commumty s markets is only half the problem Doing 
so in a fashion that addresses Eastern European, U S , and world needs is quite 
another matter There is no plan, nor was one contemplated, to define 
Commumty integration m a way that would respond to the upheaval m 
Eastern Europe There are the specific issues of East Germany and of a 
stronger, united Germany These raise new and nettling questions of special 
Community rules to adapt to circumstances radically different from those 
underlying the initial decision m 1985 to set 1992 as the target date for 
integrating Western European markets Keeping West Germany focused on
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the Community as its top priority will also be difficult enough under the 
pressure of resolving the East German revolution
There is also the question of Community discrimination It can 
assume many forms, from classical tariffs and quotas to special rules and 
criteria for access to the European market, resting quite conceivably on a 
common currency under central European bank management The stakes are 
high since the European market will exceed that of the Umted States 
Protectionist pressures are clearly abroad, evidenced by trans-Atlantic 
controversies over corporate investiture, the status of foreign banks, meat 
health standards, and European limits on the purchase of TV programs from 
offshore sources falling below a certain percentage of European investment 
These pressures show no sign of abatement in the immediate future, partly as 
a consequence of the progressive decentralization of the global economic 
system and the emergence of new centers of economic power and influence 
It would be an irony of epic proportions that, at the very time that the Soviet 
Union and the Eastern European states were demanding entry into the liberal 
capitalist system, the beneficiaries of that system would retreat from their 
own success
Strengthening the Liberal Economic System
This ironic circumstance exposes a third crisis, viz, the current 
challenge to the liberal capitalist regime that must work within a political 
order composed of sovereign nation-states under pressure from domestic 
populations and corporate and labor interests to maximize national 
advantage even at the expense of others Whereas a hegemonic United States 
was prepared and endowed in the postwar period to assume the global burden 
for the security of a capitalist market system and to absorb the cost and 
discrimination for its effective operation and extension, it is no longer willing 
or of sufficient economic weight to play these roles alone, yet there exists no 
ready substitutes for their performance Neither Germany nor Japan, despite 
their economic strength and dynamism, is eager or fully able to fill the 
vacuum While international economic cooperation is a precondition for 
surmounting current welfare crises and for contributing to the resolution of 
the order and legitimacy imperatives sketched earlier, there is no agreed upon 
formula on how to proceed Nor are international economic institutions 
adequate to the task of eliciting and institutionalizing needed reforms and 
initiatives to meet the demands of populations everywhere for more now— 
the useful phrase of Samuel Gompers in describing the aims of the early labor 
movement in the United States
Indeed, the increasing budget deficits and decreasing competitiveness 
of the U S economy—matched by unprecedented borrowing from abroad to 
finance a life style that exceeds its national means—deepen the global welfare 
crisis The bankruptcy of the socialist model and the relative misery of
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developing states only serve to temporarily mask these issues The market 
crash of fall 1987 suggests that structural fault lines persist within the 
international economic system, subjecting the system to unforeseen shocks 
and even threatening its collapse Symptomatic is the progressive rise of 
protectionism to protect home markets and to increase exports and to control 
investments at home and abroad Nationally driven mercantilist incentives 
are inherent m the nation-state system and they cannot be tamed or tempered 
simply by pious, if well-mtentioned, appeals to international cooperation 29
Crises or Opportunities7
The crises confronting Europe are systemic and simultaneous in their 
reinforcing challenge to the efficacy and legitimacy of the existing European 
order and welfare system The strategies that we pursue—and the hard 
choices that they imply—to turn these crises to advantage must also be 
synchronous with their evolution and equal in scope to their sweep and 
complexity Incrementalism won t do, whatever its allures m simpler and 
seemingly stabler times Nor should we be distracted by contrived debates 
about the end of history, with the purported triumph of liberal 
egalitarianism 30 Incrementalism is mindless since it provides no criteria or 
goals other than short-term expediency to shape the future Conversely, 
recent specious appeals to Hegelian dialectics for understanding are 
directionless since the future is explained as a linear projection of a simplistic 
interpretation of the past So much is explained that little is revealed There 
would also be no little irony in the West s adoption of an outmoded form of 
historical analysis to guide policymaking at the very time that it has been 
rejected by its Marxist-Leninist proponents
So what should we do and how should we proceed to reassemble the 
European Rubik s Cube to suit our purposes7 Only the barest outlines of an 
approach can be sketched here Several obvious principles suggest 
themselves to assist us in orienting ourselves to the crises before us First, we 
must recognize that the crises outlined above are not matters simply of 
managing conflict within a Cold War regime, but the end of that regime and 
of all its essential components As with all old regimes, past habits, interests, 
and fears—rooted in the old order—will persist As de Tocqueville 
eloquently describes, remnants of the feudal and aristocratic Anaen Régime 
survived even as they were overtaken by new and more powerful democratic 
forces 31 The demise of military blocs, German unification, Eastern European 
democratization, the reinstitution of market practices and open institutions 
m the Soviet Umon will not be accomplished overnight, if ever The arrest 
of these trends—even their reversal—cannot be excluded from a projection of 
the future, now only dimly discernible m the countervailing forces at play in 
the foreground of our present view What is ruled out, however, is any 
notion that the comfortable assumptions of the Cold War will prevail or,
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despite the best hopes generated by the present upheavals, that the future will 
necessarily be better than the past
Second, what we do—or don t do—will count in the same way that the 
titanic efforts mounted by the West since World War II to protect and 
promote its interests and values have counted until now As Kennan and 
the architects of the postwar world partially foresaw, many of Europe s 
problems today, not ironically, are in appreciable measure the product of the 
example and attraction of Western ways, which flourished behind the 
protective glacis of the Western military alliance In contrast to those that 
now argue that we can do little to help, especially m assisting the process of 
glasnost and perestroika, we should be aware that the gap between the 
socioeconomic development of the West and the East urged a radical break 
from the Soviet past To be sure, a small and determined group of men acted 
in the Kremlin to initiate internal change, however, they did not act within a 
vacuum but rather in reaction to the comparative disadvantage of the Soviet 
Union in its competition with the West That competition could not be 
sustained within the oppressive political atmosphere of the Stalimst- 
Brezhnev system under conditions of stifling bureaucratic stasis and of 
hypertrophied expenditures for a sprawling military establishment dedicated 
to bolstering coercive state power at home and a faltering empire abroad
But ideas and example will not be enough to effect desirable change 
anymore than they were during and after World War II The success of the 
Soviet reform effort and of the Gorbachev regime depends on a tenuous and 
uncoordinated coalition of forces, as sketched earlier, that are by no means 
internally coherent, cumulative, or consistent m the direction toward which 
they are pointing If the powerful elite and mass pressures that have 
produced irresistible demands for greater personal and social freedoms 
(ethnic, national, and communal), for more welfare now, and for a new 
political order are to be satisfied short of devouring the revolutions that are 
heir to them, the West will have to coordinate its collective thinking and 
resources to meet them for the sake of its own self-interest Need we be 
reminded of the Iranian case m our time or of the French and the first 
Russian Revolution7 These movements released destructive forces that 
negated the high ideals that were, purportedly, their announced aim to 
achieve
Third, as the Gorbachev example suggests, we must be prepared to 
embrace the future, not only to be relieved of the heavy and multiple costs, 
risks, and burdens of the Cold War, but also to exploit the opportunities of 
new beginnings m Europe The French have a useful phrase for this 
unsettling condition and the recommended solution—une fuite en avant— 
m which the impediments and uncertainties of the present are resolved by a 
leap into the future—not a senseless and ill-directed leap, but one acutely 
informed by the unexpected conclusion, reached through sober analysis, that
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conventional wisdom and old habits are unable to surmount Europe s crises 
How else can one fully explain what is at play m the wholesale changes 
initiated by Gorbachev and his reformist collaborators or the breathless pace 
with which they are moving, but to ensure that their innovations are 
implemented quickly to have some promise of success7
Arms Control Negotiations
We can embrace the future m several ways We should press hard at 
Vienna and Geneva to reach early arms accords that will ensure, through 
comprehensive and intrusive verification and monitoring procedures, that 
neither side can attack the other and that, if an attack is launched, it will fail 
In short, we should work for no surprises or breakthroughs But, deep Soviet 
cuts of nuclear strategic forces and offensive conventional forces (tanks, 
artillery, armor, helicopters, ground support aircraft) will have to be matched 
by the West Call the Soviets hand on their announced commitment to 
defensive-defense and their acceptance of the principle of asymmetrical cuts 
but not with the idea that the West can expect to emerge militarily ascendant 
from the exercise
Moreover, we should not exclude anything from negotiations 
Notwithstanding civilian and military bureaucratic interests (not to mention 
fear of a conservative backlash in Congress), naval forces, short-range nuclear 
weapons, and shared rules for limiting the modernization of Soviet and 
American forces will have to be addressed Arms control accords must 
provide for genuine disarmament, and not cover and legitimate the 
modernization or actual expansion of military capabilities as they have in the 
past At a minimum, m the next several months, the West should reach 
quick accord with the Warsaw pact on lowered conventional and nuclear 
force levels that it will have to accept m any case, as internal budgetary and 
welfare pressures at work on Western governments inexorably weaken and 
hollow out NATO forces Turn Necessity and wavering commitment to 
virtues
Adapting the Military to a New International Environment
We should bring armed force levels and military spending into line 
with a receding Soviet threat and with shrinking resources available for 
defense There is obviously no easy or unexceptional formula to strike the 
right balance The new political and strategic realities emerging from the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, outlined above, provide a reasonable and 
prudent set of assumptions on which to plan for the gradual but ordered 
diminution of U S nuclear and conventional forces m lockstep with Soviet 
and Warsaw Pact reductions to ensure Western security and a basis for 
meeting new strategic needs
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First, budget cuts should be calculated in real dollars, and not m phony 
bureaucratic bargaining chips The $180 billion cuts announced by Secretary 
of Defense Richard Cheney are based on the optimistic assumption of an 
actual rise m defense spending over five years against which the $180 billion 
in Pentagon cuts is then deducted, leaving the military essentially 
untouched 32 The days of Weinberger and roses are over The successive 
fall of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the disarray within the Soviet 
empire and the Warsaw Pact, the rejection of the Brezhnev doctrine, and 
lowered Soviet military spending dramatically reduce U S and Western 
military requirements in Europe The awesome (and growing) nuclear 
capabilities of the Western states, including the United States, Britain, and 
France, also counsel a slowdown in producing redundant nuclear forces, 
pending the outcome of current and follow-on nuclear arms control 
negotiations with the Soviet Union
As for strategic nuclear weapons, the relevant question is what mix of 
nuclear forces is formidable enough to preclude any Soviet incentive to strike 
first with nuclear weapons, yet sufficiently reassuring to the Soviet Umon to 
forestall the perpetuation of a costly and risky nuclear arms race The nuclear 
stalemate between the superpowers since the 1950s affords ample proof that 
unlimited spending for offensive and defensive nuclear capabilities in 
pursuit of a nuclear warfighting strategy—the ill-considered responses of the 
early Kennedy and Reagan administrations to their exaggerated projections of 
the Soviet military threat—provides neither a fruitful nor a feasible answer 
The answer lies in coordinating the shared U S and Soviet interest in 
avoiding a nuclear war and m decreasing the costs and risk of a nuclear arms 
race 33
The Umted States could take several steps to assist unilaterally this 
superpower coordination process while putting pressure on the Soviets to 
agree to deep cuts m their nuclear forces and to slow their modernization 
program Spending for the rail-mobile MX and the Midgetman missile could 
well be halted without nsk to national security The moratorium could be 
used as a bargaining lever in the START talks to induce the Soviets to 
eliminate one or both of their mobile systems There is no need to imitate 
the Soviet Union simply for imitation's sake The U S nuclear triad today, 
and its planned modernization, especially with the expansion of Trident II 
forces, is sufficiently powerful and invulnerable to discourage a Soviet first 
strike
The B-l force should be improved as a stand-off platform with all 
deliberate speed No one seriously argues that it can perform the role of a 
penetrating bomber Its shortcomings, not least among them its flawed 
electronics countermeasure package, fall short of requirements for such a
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mission Arming this aircraft with air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) 
would strengthen the triad at a reasonable cost
In tandem with upgrading the B-l bomber force as a stand-off delivery 
platform, no more B-2s should be purchased than the thirteen already under 
contract until its cost-effectiveness can be demonstrated and a realistic 
military mission devised for it At a cost of up to $1 billion a copy, the B-2 
raises serious questions about its dubious mission and the claim of supporters 
that it will be able to penetrate Soviet defenses It makes little sense to pay so 
high a price for destroying Soviet targets in a post attack environment It is by 
no means clear that there will be any lucrative military installations worth 
destroying, nor certain that, once B-2s turn on their radar to fmd them, they 
will remain in a stealth mode There are other, less costly ways to deliver 
ordinance on target The Air Force s fixed attachment to a penetrating 
bomber confuses a commitment to a particular weapon system—the manned 
bomber—with the fulfillment of a strategic mission, somewhat akin to the 
Army s pre-World War II attachment to the horse cavalry which inhibited its 
adjustment to the new conditions of tank warfare
The Trident II and the D-5 missile are still the most cost-effective 
segments of the triad, although this weapon systems also has its economic 
and strategic drawbacks Particularly troubling is the Navy s limitation of its 
nuclear missile capabilities to so few platforms If the Geneva talks succeed, 
each Trident submarine will very likely be forced to carry a smaller payload 
than the twenty-four MIRVed missiles for which it was originally designed 
Moreover, as insurance against Soviet improvements in ASW, a new 
generation of smaller ballistic missile submarines might well be undertaken 
if savings can be made m cutting back on other, more vulnerable, costly, and 
suspect strategic capabilities, like the rail-mobile MX or the B-2 While the 
triad is a useful hedge against a surprise Soviet attack, aimed at disarming the 
United States, it does not follow that all segments should be expected, 
independently, to execute the nation s single integrated operational targeting 
plan
Complementing these initiatives should be a Soviet-American accord 
on nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles A total ban could conceivably be 
verified at the production facilities phase of these weapons, reducing the 
verification requirements of inspections at sea, while leaving the Navy free to 
develop conventionally armed cruise missiles Moreover, given the greater 
vulnerability of the U S coastline to cruise attack than that of the Soviet 
Union, the United States has greater incentive to seek such a ban than does 
the Soviet Union
As for conventional forces, the recent build up and modernization of 
U S nonnuclear forces counsels against the acceleration of new systems, like 
the advanced tactical fighter at $100 billion a copy or the Burke class destroyer
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at $1 billion each If the Soviets can be induced to reduce substantially their 
offensive conventional forces in Europe at the conventional arms talks in 
Vienna, the current U S arms control position to limit U S cuts to a level of 
275,000 troops or 10 percent appears to be both too cautious and unduly costly 
It takes scant account of the precipitous erosion of Warsaw Pact military 
capabilities in the wake of the political reforms in Eastern Europe The 
maintenance of high U S troop levels, as Senator Sam Nunn has argued,34 
means that Soviet troop levels would then be maintained at levels above 
those desired by Western and Eastern European states Current planning 
goals to have ten divisions, 100 tactical air squadrons, and a Marine brigade in 
Europe within ten days of Warsaw Pact mobilization should be considered a 
contingency plan subject to reductions pending follow-on accords between 
NATO and Warsaw Pact countries Meanwhile, increased funds should be 
earmarked for reserves over active forces and units m Europe should be 
gradually redeployed m phases to U S bases Carrier forces can also be safely 
reduced to twelve carrier battle groups from the current level of fourteen, if 
reduced Soviet military spending, particularly for naval forces, is taken into 
account and if the Navy can be led to cooperate with the other armed forces, 
particularly the Air Force, in eliminating Soviet naval forces and coastal 
installations m the event of war 35
Resolving the German Problem
As for the issues of political legitimacy and economic welfare, several 
lines of thinking recommend themselves Let the people of the two 
Germâmes decide the question of how they will associate themselves, 
including the terms and conditions of unification, through free elections 
That confederation or unified government can be expected to negotiate with 
the Four Powers and its neighbors to assure them that the past is indeed 
past—German revanchist sentiments and a desire for expansion, if still 
present, are containable within a larger Europe—and that the political and 
economic futures of Germany’s(ies) neighbors will be the product of peaceful 
bargaimng and negotiations
We are not without precedents and incipient institutions to encourage 
this evolution The German Grand Coalition and the Bonn government 
under Willy Brandt demonstrated that mutual accord and accommodation 
can be reached on war guilt and on settling national boundaries The 
Conference on Security and Cooperation, the framework for the Vienna talks, 
is a ready instrument within which to resolve the question of U S and Soviet 
presence in Europe (both are European powers under the Helsinki Accords) 
and to facilitate the gradual transformation of the military blocs into guaranty 
pacts as bulwarks of a peaceful, free, and prosperous Europe None of this 
will be easy, all of it will take time and anguish to accomplish in some 
fashion, but a process of East-West engagement that leads from detente to 
entente and cooperation from the Atlantic to the Urals holds out more hope
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and benefit than the inertial perpetuation of Cold War thinking for want of 
explored alternatives
It also appears heroically optimistic to believe that a unified Germany 
can remain solely within the Atlantic Alliance 36 President Bush insisted on 
this condition in his Brussels speech of December 1989 in his report to NATO 
allies about the Malta talks Gorbachev s subsequent speech to the Soviet 
Congress, insisting on the sovereign rights of the GDR, should lay to rest any 
illusions about a Western dictated solution to German unification 37 One 
helpful way to approach the future is to return to the past—to the point in 
time referred to as zero by the Germans when the Third Reich fell and the 
power vacuum m Central Europe was filled by the Big Four The members of 
the Allied Coalition that defeated Nazi Germany have equal claims to be 
protected from any possibility of future German expansionism If casualties 
and damage are counted, the Soviet Union has an even stronger claim than 
its wartime allies to be assured of its security The logic of these contradictory 
forces—Big Four security interests, differences over assuring them, and 
German sentiment for unity—leads to the conclusion that Germany must 
either join both alliances within the framework, say, of the Conference on 
Security and Coopération in Europe or withdraw from both, following the 
Austrian example In either case, Moscow and Washington will have to join 
to guarantee Europe’s security and Germany s pacification in a post-Cold War 
world On the assumption of a genuine demilitarization of the central front 
and of Soviet offensive capabilities, would such a security arrangement be all 
that bad7
Economics of Peace
Why not consider the proposition of massive aid for Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union7 Why should the West be hesitant to spend a fraction 
of the trillions that it spent on defense to ensure that the changes that it has 
long demanded are preserved and promoted in Eastern Europe7 It is not a 
question of throwing money at the problem in the naive hope that simply 
transferring resources to the East will be efficacious First, in the short run, 
the Western nations, including a reluctant Japan, must expand and 
coordinate its efforts to meet the urgent humanitarian needs of Eastern 
Europe For the long run, they must simultaneously develop plans, in 
cooperation with the Eastern Europeans, for meeting the capital, managerial, 
and technological requirements that are preconditions for the transformation 
of these flawed economic systems m adapting to an open, market system
Acute shortages of food and basic necessities (soap, fuel, medianes, and 
clothing) should be met to preclude mass unrest and disillusionment, the 
conditions for a conservative backlash in Eastern Europe For the future, a 
poc 3d Western developmental fund should be organized, an idea floated by 
French President François Mitterrand, to furnish the capital needed to force-
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start new enterprises m socialist states on the condition that the reforms 
continue Foreign assistance will be needed, as Harvard economist Jeffrey 
Sachs, an adviser to the non-Communist Warsaw government, argues, to 
tide the Eastern European states over in this long transition process by 
providing safety nets of unemployment insurance, job retraining, and health 
care 38 This would establish a supportive economic structure and a salubrious 
investment climate encouraging to private investors Such long-term 
assistance must obviously be dovetailed with the progressive extension of 
political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and accompanied by 
assurances that they would not be overturned Otherwise, as Andrei 
Sakharov suggested, the West would be pouring water into loose sand
The Umted States should also press its European partners to widen the 
Economic Commumty beyond the twelve as soon as possible to encompass 
the states of Eastern Europe, including eventually the Soviet Union German 
energies will then be absorbed m a greater Europe to which its own political 
and economic ambitions will be irretrievably entangled Such a large and 
admittedly sprawling assemblage, whether partially integrated or open to 
flexible arrangements for conditional association, would relax some of the 
concern about the prospect of a protectionist Europe emerging m 1992 Such a 
Europe of patries (national fatherlands) is not likely to become any time soon 
a political force for expansion, but it would be an antidote to war and the 
framework within which regional and global economic cooperation could be 
facilitated based on most-favored nation principles As a gesture of good 
faith, the United States should immediately repeal the Jackson-Vanik 
amendment that denies application of this principle to the Soviet Union If 
the Soviet Union is a partner within an enlarged European Community— 
which might give form and substance to Gorbachev s vague reference to a 
common European home—then the criticisms of those who fear foreign 
intervention into Soviet affairs through Western economic imperialism 
might be somewhat stilled
Reform at Home
How well the United States will profit from favorable changes within 
the international environment will critically depend on how well it reacts 
internally to these opportunities for ending the Cold War in Europe and for 
relaxing the global superpower struggle First, unless there is a fundamental 
reform of the budgetary and strategic planning and decision making process, 
there will be no effective way of knowing that the nation will get its money s 
worth for defense or of assuring that it will have an adequate defense The 
decentralization of the defense policy process inhibits an economically 
efficient and strategically effective military posture Several bad habits must 
be curbed the ability of the services to resist cooperation and the 
rationalization of roles and missions, must be curbed along with the political 
clout of the iron-tnangle of Congress, the military services, and arms
23
producers that foster waste and redundancy, and Congressional habits of 
micromanagement and constituent intervention that substitute for strategic 
direction and oversight of defense policy
Recent efforts, like the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 
1986, Goldwater-Nichols, to strengthen the coordinating power of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) are steps in the right direction, but reform has not gone 
far enough to provide the President and the Congress with military plans and 
budgetary proposals independent of parochial service interests and those 
castellated around them from Congressional and corporate sources The 
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS should be given greater 
authority to evaluate service capabilities in terms of over-all roles and 
missions, to reduce unnecessary duplication m weapons procurement, and to 
elicit service cooperation in devising a national strategy based on national 
needs rather than on narrow bureaucratic, corporate, or pork barrel interests
Moreover, it is not enough that the Department of Defense be 
reformed to effect cuts m defense spending These cannot be resisted anyway 
by the Pentagon if current political and economic trends persist The more 
challenging task is to make cuts that make strategic sense As military 
requirements in Europe diminish, new and heretofore neglected strategic 
missions need to be addressed These include the protection of allies, such as 
Israel, peacekeeping operations under UN and international auspices, and 
intervention abroad for humanitarian purposes to protect life and property 
and, where feasible, to ensure open institutions and international standards 
of conduct New weapons, organizational units, training, and strategies will 
have to be designed for these missions In reorienting and adapting the 
military establishment to a post-Cold War international environment, we 
should not deceive ourselves into believing that defimng new roles and 
missions will be easy or conflict free As U S interventions in El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, Grenada, and Panama reveal, these are not self-evident aims nor 
are they mutually compatible The best we can hope for is candor and 
accountability m their pursuit—criteria recognized more in the breach than 
in the observance m Iran-Contra—as a basis for military planning A 
precondition for a domestically supportable, internationally viable, and cost- 
effective strategic posture is the fixing of greater responsibility for decisions 
within the Pentagon in the offices of the JCS and the Secretary of Defense In 
the absence of pinpointing authority, responsibility, and accountability, we 
will be held hostage to a diffuse and decentralized decisionmaking and 
political process that has produced almost untold waste, that has fostered 
corruption, and that, arguably, has not always produced the kinds of military 
capabilities and plans we needed to meet our own long-term security and 
welfare needs
Second, real cuts in defense spending should be redeployed to arrest 
receding United States economic competitiveness and declining techno­
scientific leadership which are the principal threats to U S strength today 
While a national debate is needed to determine how this defense dividend 
should be spent, there are several worthy, and not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, targets for these released funds Among these are reductions in the 
national debt (aimed at lowering interest rates and increasing incentives for 
investment), tax breaks for innovation and product development as well as 
for faster write-offs for plant renewal to increase efficiency and exports, and 
improvement in the nation s education, transportation, and logistics base to 
promote productivity and economic growth
Finally, strong U S leadership is needed as never before precisely 
because of the relative decline of U S economic power compared to the 
immediate postwar period when Washington was pretty much able to have 
its way If raw American power does not weigh as much as before, then 
intelligent direction and careful use of the resources that we have assume 
heightened importance The margins for error are narrower and the 
prospects of having a positive impact are lower, yet the stakes have never 
been greater We might do well to stop lamenting the loss of hegemony that 
may have been illusory—certainly fleeting—in a world of over four billion 
contentious peoples, grouped in states, still at sixes and sevens with 
themselves We should not count out quickly an economy of over four 
trillion dollars, nor military forces unsurpassed by any other nation on the 
globe Nor should the asset of an energetic and talented population be 
forgotten or denigrated as the most decisive and replemshable resource at our 
disposal
The American experiment is also relevant to the European crises They 
are microcosms of larger global problems associated with the continuing quest 
for a more durable, prosperous, and just socioeconomic and political regime 
than those that came before Like the American experiment, the world 
community is engaged more in a continuing process of change and renewal 
than m the pursuit of a fixed or Grand Design The American experience 
testifies to the possibility—forged admittedly by civil war and strife—that 
regional, ethnic, national, racial and communal differences can be 
transcended in definmg a rule of law and social compact that rests on solid 
popular consent
A great people does not need great leaders What is needed simply are 
leaders of sufficient inner light and strength to explain the State of the Union 
to each age and to mark out plainly, without adulteration, the sacrifices, 
material and psychological, that have to be made to achieve a more perfect 
Union whose frontiers—traced in the European revolutions partly of our 
own making—have no clearly discernible limits
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Notes
1 The reference is, of course, to the remark of Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign 
Minister, at the start of World War I The lamps are going out all over 
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